

Strengthening Non-military Defense to Strengthen the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia

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Abstract

Purpose: This study aims to explore effective strategies and measures necessary to strengthen non-military defence in Indonesia in response to increasingly complex non-military threats driven by technological advancements and globalisation.

Design/Methodology/Approach: The research adopts a qualitative approach with descriptive analysis to investigate inter-agency coordination, community participation, and technological integration as key elements of non-military defence strategy. Data were collected from various sources, including relevant legislation, academic studies, and real cases in Indonesia.

Findings: The analysis indicates that although Article 30(2) of the 1945 Constitution and Article 7(3) of Law No. 3 of 2002 emphasise the importance of participation by all national components, the implementation of non-military defence in Indonesia faces challenges due to unclear legal frameworks and insufficient inter-agency coordination. The 2023 cyber-attacks underscore the urgency for comprehensive regulation and effective coordination practices.

Originality/Value: This study contributes new insights by proposing a multidimensional approach to reinforce non-military defence through cross-agency collaboration, enhanced digital capacity, and community involvement, aiming to build a more responsive defence system.

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INTRODUCTION

Indonesia, as an independent nation, aims to ensure the welfare and security of its people, as outlined in the preamble of the 1945 Constitution. Sustainable development in various sectors has been undertaken to fulfil the mandate of national development, including human development to bolster national defence (Sulistiyanto et al., 2021). However, the reduction in military threats and similar global changes necessitate a reassessment of Indonesia's defence strategy (Indrawan & Efriza, 2018). Defence issues require a holistic approach, as the nature of threats to national unity and safety evolves with technological advancements. Such threats include transnational crimes like human smuggling, which are considered non-military security threats. Therefore, there is a pressing need for comprehensive defence strategies that incorporate modern technology and non-military measures to enhance national vigilance and response to strategic threats in the Asia-Pacific, particularly in Indonesia. This urgency stems from Indonesia's status as one of the world's largest archipelagic states, with extensive maritime access that is not matched by sufficient defence and security personnel. Addressing this disparity, a comprehensive defence approach must consider both military and non-military capabilities.

Researchers such as Prasetyo et al (2023); Saragi (2023); Wardani et al. (2022) emphasise the importance of non-military defence capabilities, including economic, social, and cultural resilience, as essential elements for national cohesion. Establishing reserve components with competent state defence knowledge is critical, as these components can support primary defence efforts and strengthen overall national defence. Systematic and comprehensive state defence efforts are crucial to bolstering non-military defence. In line with this, Soepandji & Farid, (2018) proposed a state defence education system beginning at secondary education and extending to higher education or employment readiness. A legally backed recruitment framework is expected to enhance non-military defence capabilities to safeguard Indonesia's security and stability. Furthermore, an established legal basis would guide the formulation of curricula, policies, and regulations that support state defence efforts and contribute to national resilience.

The implementation of national development depends significantly on the effectiveness of planned and well-executed long-term (25 years) and medium-term (5 years) development plans established during the 1998 reform era. However, the current democratic landscape poses challenges and obstacles to the execution of national development plans. As Buzan et al., (1998) noted, national defence, including non-military threats, was underscored in the 2008 Defence White Paper by the Ministry of Defence, acknowledging the possibility of hybrid and non-military threats.

Historical accounts since the declaration of independence on 17 August 1945 through the reform era illustrate that non-military threats have been more prominent than military ones. These non-military threats have included significant events such as the economic crisis leading to the May 1998 riots, the Poso conflict in 1998, the Ambon conflict in 2001, and other disturbances across the nation. Additionally, the widespread distribution of narcotics has had severe repercussions, resulting in numerous casualties that remain unresolved. Transnational ideologies exploiting digital media have also influenced public perception, leading to increased radicalism and acts of violence and terrorism. Moreover, technological advancements have facilitated cyber-attacks on government institutions, such as the cyber assault on Bank Syariah Indonesia in Aceh in

May 2023, data breaches involving government entities, and the General Elections Commission (KPU) in November 2023.

The urgency of this research lies in the need to reinforce non-military defence to counter the evolving and complex nature of non-military threats driven by technological progress and globalisation. Weaknesses in coordination and synergy among government agencies in addressing such threats indicate a gap requiring targeted management, as failure to address this could hinder national stability and development.

The novelty of this research lies in its proposed multidimensional approach to strengthening non-military defence in Indonesia, focusing on cross-agency collaboration, enhanced digital capacity, and community-based strategies to bolster national vigilance. This approach not only highlights inter-agency coordination but also stresses community involvement as part of the solution. The research aims to explore effective strategies for reinforcing non-military defence capabilities, ensuring Indonesia is equipped to address emerging non-military threats. Strategic identification measures are necessary to enhance coordination and synergy between government institutions, the private sector, and community elements to tackle complex challenges in the modern era. The research seeks to answer how Indonesia can effectively strengthen its non-military defence to face these challenges and what strategic steps are needed to improve coordination and resilience among government bodies and community stakeholders in enhancing national security against non-military threats.

Literature Review

Theoretical Studies

Non-military defence plays a crucial role in maintaining national stability in a modern era characterised by non-traditional threats. Literature indicates that cross-agency coordination, community involvement, and technological utilisation are essential for reinforcing national resilience. The complexities brought by globalisation and technological advancements necessitate a robust and comprehensive framework grounded in non-traditional security theory (Buzan et al. (1998); Caballero-Anthony & Emmers (2017); Masys (2022), alongside the perspectives outlined in the Defence White Paper.

The Need for Comprehensive Legal Foundations for Non-Military Defence

Indonesia requires a strong legal basis for the effective and structured implementation of non-military defence, as mandated by Article 30(2) of the 1945 Constitution, which emphasises the participation of all national components in the defence and security system. However, ambiguities in the implementing laws concerning non-military defence have created gaps within this framework. Law No. 3 of 2002 on State Defence, particularly Article 7(3), highlights that non-defence government institutions play a primary role in addressing non-military threats. Nevertheless, detailed regulations on how these institutions should prepare and coordinate defence efforts remain lacking. The impact of globalisation and the growing threat of cyber-attacks further underline the urgency for appropriate legal provisions Clarke & Knake (2014); Knake (2010) argue that digital readiness within official government institutions must be an integral part of national security policy. Without clear legal frameworks, efforts to

maintain cyber security and prevent digital attacks will continue to lag behind the rapidly evolving nature of such threats.

Challenges of Coordination and Implementation at the Institutional Level

Kapucu (2006) highlights the importance of cross-sector collaboration to prevent fragmented responses and enhance the effectiveness of addressing threats. Therefore, ministries and regional governments must share a unified vision to ensure the success of non-military defence strategies. The response to the Covid-19 pandemic demonstrated the significance of coordination, albeit with notable shortcomings that required continuous improvement, particularly after the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 7 of 2020. Additionally, Law No. 3 of 2002 on State Defence, specifically Article 15, points out that the absence of a National Defence Council poses a significant challenge. This council is expected to advise the President on general defence policies and coordinate national defence components. Its absence has led to uncoordinated and sectoral approaches in managing non-military threats.

Strengthening Efforts and Strategic Measures

Strategic measures must be outlined to enhance the effectiveness of non-military defence. It is imperative for the government and the House of Representatives (DPR) to draft new legislation supporting the implementation of Article 30(2) of the 1945 Constitution and Article 7(3) of Law No. 3 of 2002. The aim is to provide clarity and guidance for ministries and agencies in defining inter-agency coordination and policy. Establishing a National Defence Council would ensure that non-military threat management is systematic, coherent in policy formulation, encourages public participation, and builds national resilience. As Pharr, S. J., & Putnam (2000) note, social capital encompassing trust and social networks plays a significant role in strengthening collective capabilities to face threats. Considering community participation, Santoso et al. (2023a), (2023b) emphasise that socio-cultural activities can facilitate rapid identification and response to threats. Furthermore, the integration of technology in non-military defence, as advocated by Prayuda et al. (2022); Raska (2019), should be developed as an early detection system to counter cyber threats, supporting Indonesia's aim to construct a more robust and resilient non-military defence strategy.

METHODS

This study employed a qualitative research design with a descriptive approach, following Creswell & Poth (2024); Lichtman (2013), to elucidate efforts to strengthen non-military defence in preserving the unity of Indonesia. Narrative analysis, as suggested by (Fadli, 2021), was used to explore the role of non-defence government agencies as the main actors, as stipulated by Article 7(3) of Law No. 3 of 2002 on State Defence, supported by other national elements. This approach is particularly relevant as non-military threats, such as ideological, political, economic, socio-cultural, and technological challenges, have intensified in the era of globalisation. The study focused on inter-agency coordination, community participation, and technological integration as key components of effective non-military defence strategies to safeguard national unity.




Figure 1: Conceptual Research Framework

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Implementation and Challenges of Non-Military Defence

The objective of Indonesia, as stated in the preamble of the 1945 Constitution, is to establish a government that protects all citizens, promotes general welfare, enriches national life, and contributes to global peace based on independence, enduring peace, and social justice. Additionally, Article 1(3) of the Constitution affirms that Indonesia is a rule-of-law state. Consequently, government operations, including the execution of national defence, must adhere to applicable laws. The implementation of non-military defence to address non-traditional threats heavily relies on existing regulations. Thus, analysing the regulatory framework underpinning non-military defence is essential for assessing its adequacy and determining whether enhancements are required to support stakeholders in its execution.

Article 30 of the 1945 Constitution outlines the rights and obligations of citizens in national defence and security efforts, conducted through a universal defence system with the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) and the Indonesian National Police (POLRI) as the primary forces and the people as supporting elements. Laws No. 2 of 2002 on the Indonesian National Police and No. 3 of 2002 on State Defence have been enacted as a follow-up to Article 30(3) and (4). However, Article 30(2), which details the universal defence and security system, remains inadequately addressed in current legislation. This raises concerns regarding the implementation of non-military defence, which should involve various entities, including ministries, government institutions, local governments, and the community.

Article 7 (3) of Law No. 3 of 2002 states that non-military threats position non-defence government agencies as the main actors, supported by other national elements. However, comprehensive regulations detailing how these components should be established and coordinated are lacking. The response to the Covid-19 pandemic revealed that, without a clear framework, initial efforts were sectoral and lacked synergy, only

improving after the establishment of the Covid-19 Task Force. The absence of the National Defence Council, as mandated by Article 15 of Law No. 3 of 2002, is another significant challenge. This council should advise the President on general defence policies and coordinate national defence components. Its non-existence results in the absence of a formal mechanism to define the roles of primary and supporting elements in addressing non-military threats and to ensure cross-sector collaboration functions as an integrated system.

Additionally, Government Regulation No. 23 of 1959 on States of Emergency is considered outdated, as it does not address current multidimensional threats encompassing ideology, politics, economy, socio-culture, technology, and public safety. The evolving nature of threats necessitates updated regulations to manage states of emergency in response to non-military challenges. New legislation should emphasise non-military defence, reinforce the role of the National Defence Council, and replace outdated regulations to provide a clear framework for all stakeholders, enhance coordination, and ensure the effective implementation of non-military defence for the protection of national unity.

Efforts to Strengthen Non-Military Defence

The execution of national defence against non-military threats must follow existing regulations. To ascertain whether non-military defence has been effectively prepared and implemented, it is essential to review and analyse the legal framework guiding its execution by relevant stakeholders. Analysis reveals several issues hindering the optimal implementation of non-military defence, including:

- a. The absence of legislation addressing Article 30(2) of the 1945 Constitution, defining national defence and security, the universal defence system, and stakeholder involvement.
- b. The lack of specific regulations elaborating on Article 7(3) of Law No. 3 of 2002, preventing ministries, government agencies, and local governments from adequately preparing non-military defence in line with their functions. Clear guidelines on how to develop, manage, and utilise national defence components to address non-military threats are also missing.
- c. The National Defence Council, intended to advise the President on general defence policy and coordinate all defence components as per Article 15 of Law No. 3 of 2002, has not been established.
- d. The need for updated legislation to replace Government Regulation No. 23 of 1959 on States of Emergency, which is no longer suitable for current conditions.

Addressing these issues requires immediate action to support the implementation of non-military defence. Proposed efforts include::

- a. The government, with the House of Representatives (DPR), should promptly draft and enact laws to support non-military defence implementation:
 - 1) Legislation addressing Article 30(2) of the 1945 Constitution concerning the universal defence and security system.

- 2) Legislation elaborating on Article 7(3) of Law No. 3 of 2002 concerning non-military defence.
 - 3) Legislation to replace Government Regulation No. 23 of 1959 on States of Emergency
- b. Establishing the National Defence Council to advise the President and coordinate defence components, as mandated by Article 15 of Law No. 3 of 2002.
 - c. Conducting intensive outreach on newly enacted regulations to all non-military defence stakeholders, including local governments and the public, to ensure understanding and adherence in the development and implementation of non-military defence.
 - d. Monitoring the preparation and execution of non-military defence by stakeholders, overseen by the President and the National Defence Council, to ensure alignment with established general policies.

Given the vital importance of non-military defence for national survival, strong commitment from all parties is essential to address existing issues. Strengthening non-military defence will enable effective responses to evolving non-military threats in an era of rapid technological advancement, ultimately reinforcing the unity of Indonesia.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, non-military defence plays a critical role in safeguarding and maintaining the unity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) against a range of evolving non-military threats in the global era. While various ministries and government agencies have made efforts based on the types of threats encountered, implementation has been suboptimal due to insufficient integrated coordination and the absence of necessary regulations. Analysis indicates that the provisions of Article 30(2) of the 1945 Constitution, Article 7(3), and Article 15 of Law No. 3 of 2002 have not been fully addressed. Furthermore, Government Regulation No. 23 of 1959 on States of Emergency is outdated and needs replacement with more relevant legislation.

Future research should delve deeper into the effectiveness of cross-agency coordination and the empirical implementation of non-military defence policies. Such studies should include an evaluation of the roles of stakeholders and the impact of outreach efforts regarding new regulations. Recommendations for the government and DPR include the immediate drafting of laws to support non-military defence, the formation of the National Defence Council, and raising public awareness and participation. These actions are expected to create a more responsive and coordinated non-military defence system capable of addressing complex non-military threats effectively.

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