



The Failure of Intelligence Integration in Economic Policy: A Study of Indonesia Fuel Policy

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Article Info:	Abstract
Keywords: <i>Asta Gatra</i> ; Fuel Price Policy; Intelligence-Policy Gap; National Resilience; Strategic Intelligence.	Purpose: To examine the relationship between intelligence analysis and policy formulation during Indonesia's 2022 fuel price increase, identifying factors affecting the integration of intelligence findings into government decisions and their implications for national resilience within the <i>Asta Gatra</i> framework. Study Design/Methodology/Approach: A qualitative case study draws on interviews with informants involved in policy formulation and familiar with energy-sector decision-making, supported by relevant official documents. Process tracing and pattern matching were employed to analyse the relationship between intelligence assessments and policy decisions. Findings: Intelligence assessments were available and disseminated before the fuel price decision but were insufficiently integrated into policy formulation. Contributing factors included divergent policy orientations, selective utilisation of intelligence, and the absence of formal procedures connecting intelligence assessments with decision-making. Implications: Strengthening institutional mechanisms for integrating intelligence into strategic policymaking requires clearly defined access points, structured coordination, and feedback systems to improve the utilisation of early warnings in government decisions. Originality/Value: The findings extend the intelligence-policy gap concept by demonstrating how policymakers' preferences and institutional readiness jointly influence intelligence integration. The analysis provides a conceptual basis for improving intelligence-policy coordination, early warning mechanisms, and national resilience across the economic, social, political, and defence and security dimensions of <i>Asta Gatra</i> .
Article History: Received : 2025-07-18 Revised : 2026-02-21 Accepted : 2026-03-02 Available Online : 2026-06-30 Published : 2026-06-30	
Article DOI : 10.55960/jlri.v1402.1133	
How to cite : Rumahorbo, P., Luthfi, M., Saptatia, H., Rohman, I.K. (2026). The Failure of Intelligence Integration in Economic Policy: A Study of Indonesia Fuel Policy. <i>Jurnal Lemhannas RI</i> , 14 (2), 121-135. https://doi.org/10.55960/jlri.v1402.1133	
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INTRODUCTION

The relationship between intelligence organisations and policymakers is a central issue in intelligence studies, as intelligence's success is determined by its ability to generate accurate information (Herman, 2013; Kent, 1966; Sternberg, 2019) as well as its use in decision-making (Brantly et al., 2016; Hulnick, 2006). Intelligence literature generally explains that its primary function is to support policymakers by providing the information needed to anticipate threats (Kent, 1966; Herman, 2013). However, other literature indicates that the relationship between intelligence and policymakers is often fraught with politicisation (Eisenfeld, 2017), differing preferences (Marrin, 2013), and barriers to information distribution (Jervis, 2010), which can create a gap between intelligence analysis results and government decisions. Intelligence effectiveness depends on the ability to integrate analysis results into the policy-making process, not solely on the quality of the information produced.

Contemporary national security is no longer limited to military threats but also encompasses economic threats (Herzog, 2008; Seiglie et al., 2008; Wright, 1991), particularly energy security (Inderwildi et al., 2020; Kuzemko et al., 2025; Schmitz et al., 2025). Energy security impacts economic, social, and political stability, making it a crucial element of a country's early warning system (Correljé & van der Linde, 2006; Farrell et al., 2004). Energy policy, as a high-risk policy, requires intelligence support to anticipate multidimensional consequences (Khan, 2025; Wang et al., 2024). The effectiveness of energy policy therefore depends on the extent to which intelligence analysis is integrated into decision-making through institutional relationships between intelligence organisations and policymakers.

Indonesia's transition from an oil exporter to a net oil importer since 2004 has increased the significance of energy security as a national strategic issue. Figure 1 presents a comparison of Indonesia's oil consumption and production in 2022 to illustrate the gap between domestic demand and national production capacity.




Figure 1. Comparison of Oil Production and Consumption in Indonesia

Source: Author's compilation based on data from the Energy Institute (2023) and the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (2022)

Indonesia's dependence on oil imports increases its vulnerability to changes in international prices, supply disruptions, and policies of producing countries. Rising global oil prices simultaneously increase fiscal pressures, production costs, and inflation. This vulnerability was evident in 2022 when the Russia-Ukraine conflict pushed global crude

oil prices above USD 120 per barrel, increasing the burden of subsidies and energy compensation on the state budget. The government subsequently raised subsidised fuel prices through Ministerial Decree No. 218.K./MG.01/MEM.M./2022 to maintain fiscal stability.

This policy was followed by annual inflation of 5.95 per cent, according to the Central Statistics Agency (BPS), one of the highest since 2014, and a wave of demonstrations in various regions from September to November 2022. These impacts demonstrate that fuel pricing policies affect not only economic stability but also social, security, and political stability as key components of national resilience within the *Asta Gatra* perspective. The complexity of these risks places early warning intelligence as a crucial instrument in supporting decision-making while also raising questions about the extent to which intelligence analysis results were integrated into the policy formulation process for the 2022 fuel price increase. The relationship between intelligence analysis results and government decisions still requires empirical explanation.

Two research questions guide the analysis. First, how did intelligence assessments inform the formulation of Indonesia's 2022 fuel price adjustment policy? Second, what factors influenced the integration of intelligence assessments produced by the State Intelligence Agency (BIN) into government decision-making? Addressing these questions extends the application of the intelligence-policy relationship and intelligence-policy gap concepts to strategic economic policymaking, providing a conceptual basis for strengthening institutional coordination, early warning systems, and intelligence integration within the public policy process to support the economic, socio-cultural, political, and defence and security dimensions of national resilience.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Theoretical Overview

In modern governance practices, the relationship between intelligence and public policy is becoming increasingly important because many strategic state decisions are made in situations of high uncertainty (Lonsdale, 2012; Rahman, 2022). However, this relationship often experiences an intelligence-policy gap, namely a disconnect between the results of intelligence analysis and the political decisions taken by the government (Jervis, 2006; Lowenthal, 2021; Teitelbaum, 2005). Lowenthal (2021) explains that intelligence-policy gap arises from weaknesses in intelligence analysis, including reliance on readily available data and mirror imaging, as well as from policymakers who ignore, distort, or politicise intelligence because of political preferences, short-term interests, weak institutional integration, or the selective use of intelligence to legitimise policy decisions. Lowenthal's framework provides a stronger analytical basis for this study because it explains the institutional relationship between intelligence organisations and policymakers, whereas the intelligence cycle primarily focuses on intelligence production (Herman, 2013; Hulnick, 2006), the psychological approach, which emphasises cognitive bias (Jervis, 2006); or the bureaucratic political model, which highlights interagency rivalry (Allison & Halperin, 1972), making it more appropriate for analysing the successes and failures of intelligence integration in policy formulation.

Empirical Studies

Research on Fuel Price Policy and National Security

Several studies on energy subsidies indicate that fuel price increases are almost always accompanied by increased social resistance (Canavire Bacarreza et al., 2023; Nabernegg et al., 2024). These findings indicate that energy policy is a high-risk policy because its impacts reach almost all levels of society. However, research on fuel price increases is still dominated by political economy approaches that focus on subsidies, inflation, poverty, and public purchasing power (Akhmad et al., 2023; Karlilar Pata & Pata, 2025; Muthalib et al., 2018). Consequently, researchers have not extensively studied the relationship between intelligence analysis and the energy policy formulation process.

Research on the Intelligence-Policy Relationship

Research on the intelligence-policy gap has flourished in intelligence studies across various countries, but its operationalisation remains dominated by the contexts of war (Campbell, 2013), terrorism (Treverton, 2009), and foreign policy (Sternberg, 2019). Conversely, research examining the relationship between intelligence organisations, intelligence analysis results, and government decisions regarding strategic economic policy remains very limited. The post-reformed Indonesian intelligence literature also focuses more on institutional reform (Mengko et al., 2016; Widjajanto & Wardhani, 2008) and ideological deradicalisation (Irawan, 2024; Suharyanto, 2016), failing to explain how intelligence analysis results are integrated into the economic policy formulation process.

Research Gap

The existing literature has not yet constructed the fuel price increase policy as a non-military security issue requiring multidimensional threat analysis, early warning systems, and the integration of intelligence analysis results into the policy formulation process. This gap indicates that the relationship between intelligence analysis results and government decisions, as well as the factors influencing the level of integration between the two, remains empirically unexplained. Therefore, this study examines the 2022 fuel price increase policy using the intelligence-policy relationship and intelligence-policy gap perspectives to explain the relationship between intelligence analysis and the policy formulation process and to identify factors influencing the integration of BIN intelligence analysis results with government decisions.

METHODS

This research uses a qualitative approach with a case study design to examine the policy formulation process for the 2022 fuel price increase. This case study was selected for its capacity to facilitate a comprehensive reconstruction of the policy process, inter-institutional interactions, and mechanisms present in a contemporary phenomenon (Yin, 2018). The unit of analysis is the policy formulation process for the 2022 fuel price increase, with a focus on the relationship between intelligence analysis results and the decision-making process, as well as the factors influencing the integration of intelligence analysis results into government policy.

The research data consists of primary and secondary data. Primary data were obtained through semi-structured interviews with purposive sampling, involving informants directly involved in the policy formulation process for the 2022 fuel price increase or possessing authority and knowledge regarding policy formulation

mechanisms in the energy sector. Informants included active and retired officials from Deputy IV and Deputy IX of the State Intelligence Agency (BIN), policy planners at the Directorate General of Oil and Gas at the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM), the Directorate of Fuel at the Downstream Oil and Gas Regulatory Agency (BPH Migas), the Special Task Force for Upstream Oil and Gas Business Activities (SKK Migas), and the Directorate General of Budget at the Ministry of Finance. Secondary data was obtained through a review of legally obtained public and institutional documents, including laws and regulations, official reports, and coordination documents related to the policy formulation process for the 2022 fuel price increase. Data validity was strengthened through triangulation between interview results and documents to ensure consistent findings from various data sources.

Data analysis used process tracing and pattern matching (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, Yin, 2018). Process tracing was used to reconstruct the sequence of events, explore causal mechanisms, and explain the relationship between intelligence analysis results and the policy formulation process. This analysis also verifies that the intelligence production and dissemination process takes place before decision-making, allowing for systematic causality between events (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). Pattern matching is used to compare the predictive patterns generated in intelligence products with the economic, security, and political conditions that occurred after the 2022 fuel price increase, thus identifying factors influencing the level of integration of intelligence analysis results into government decisions (Yin, 2018). This analytical framework operationalises the concepts of intelligence-policy relationships and the intelligence-policy gap (Lowenthal, 2021) to explain the relationship between intelligence analysis results, the policy formulation process, and the factors influencing their integration into government decision-making.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Result

Intelligence Dissemination Prior to the 2022 Fuel Price Policy

Process tracing results indicate that intelligence products were produced and disseminated before the government implemented the policy to increase fuel prices in September 2022. A reconstruction of the sequence of events based on document analysis, interviews with informants from the State Intelligence Agency (BIN) and energy sector technical institutions, and inter-source triangulation indicates that BIN gradually disseminated analyses regarding vulnerabilities in energy sector governance and potential threats resulting from global oil market dynamics throughout 2022.

In early 2022, BIN compiled a Basic Descriptive Intelligence (BDI) report, detailing the state of national oil sector governance, including projections of the impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on the global oil market. As global oil prices rose, BIN published periodic reports updating developments in the energy sector on risks. Ahead of the government's planned fuel price increase in August 2022, BIN again submitted a situational analysis identifying the potential economic, social, political, and security consequences of the policy.

Interviews confirmed that all reports were disseminated to the President as the user of the intelligence and were part of discussions in a coordination forum involving the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, the Ministry of Finance, SKK Migas, BPH

Migas, PT Pertamina, and the State Intelligence Agency (BIN). This chronological sequence indicates that the intelligence production and dissemination process took place before the government implemented the 2022 fuel price increase.




Figure 2. Intelligence Analysis of Issues in Indonesia's Oil Management
Source: Compiled by the author from the 2023 Basic Descriptive Intelligence (BDI).

Figure 2 shows that BIN identified structural issues in national oil governance, encompassing the upstream sector, pricing mechanisms, downstream distribution, and oversight of policy implementation. The analysis also illustrates the link between energy sector vulnerabilities and potential economic, social, political, and security impacts that require cross-sector coordination. Government-issued policies do not fully reflect some of BIN's recommendations, according to the pattern matching results. A comparison of the recommendations in the intelligence report and the decisions issued by each stakeholder reveals a divergent pattern between intelligence recommendations and policy responses.

The BIN analysis focuses on structural improvements to energy sector governance, including reformulating pricing mechanisms, strengthening distribution oversight, limiting the use of subsidised fuel, improving public communication, and creating a more conducive investment climate. In contrast, government policy focuses more on fiscal stabilisation through fuel price adjustments and providing compensation in the form of social assistance.

Table 1. Comparison between Policy Decisions and Intelligence Recommendations

Stakeholders	Recommendations from the State Intelligence Agency	Policymaking	Status
President	Revise Presidential Regulation No. 191 of 2014 in coordination with the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, Pertamina, and relevant agencies to enable the timely implementation of subsidised fuel restrictions.	Presidential Regulation (Perpres) No. 98 of 2022	The subject has not been adopted.
The Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources, and the Special Task Force for Upstream Oil and Gas Business Activities	There is a need to review the method for determining the Indonesia Crude Price (ICP) and domestic fuel prices to reduce the potential for manipulation in their determination.	Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources Decree No. 111.K/MG.03/DJM/2022 and Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources Decree No. 140.K/MG.03/DKM/2022 set the ICP for September 2022 at US\$86.07 per barrel, with effect from 3 October 2022	The subject has not been adopted.
Downstream Oil and Gas Regulatory Agency	Establish a monitoring framework for subsidised fuel restrictions in coordination with security forces and local authorities.	A Memorandum of Understanding was signed with Deputy IV of the State Intelligence Agency (BIN) to monitor subsidised fuel distribution.	Adopted.
The Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources and PT Pertamina (State-Owned Enterprise)	The objective of this initiative is to raise public awareness of the new scheme for the distribution of subsidised fuel, with a view to minimising social risks.	None.	The subject has not been adopted.
Minister of Finance	The Minister of Finance, in coordination with the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources,	The Minister of Finance issued Regulation No. 159/PMK.02/2022, amending Regulation No. 159/PMK.02/2021 on the	The subject has not been adopted.

Stakeholders	Recommendations from the State Intelligence Agency	Policymaking	Status
	should formulate fiscal policies to promote investment through fiscal and non-fiscal incentives, refinery site planning, streamlined licensing procedures, and regulatory certainty.	provision, disbursement, and accountability of compensation funds for revenue shortfalls resulting from regulated fuel and electricity prices.	

Source: Compiled by the author through a comparison between recommendations contained in intelligence reports and policy decisions issued by the stakeholders in 2022.

Table 1 shows that only one recommendation was directly adopted, namely cooperation between BPH Migas and BIN in overseeing the distribution of subsidised fuel. Other recommendations, including revising regulations on subsidised fuel use, evaluating the Indonesia Crude Price (ICP) mechanism, strengthening public communication, and reforming energy sector investment policies, have not been incorporated into government decisions.

Summary of Empirical Findings on Intelligence Integration

The results of interviews, document analysis, and pattern matching indicate that intelligence integration in the policy formulation process for the 2022 fuel price increase was limited. Intelligence products consistently recommend structural improvements to energy sector governance, while government policy focuses more on fiscal stabilisation through fuel price adjustments and social compensation. The low adoption rate of intelligence recommendations reflected this difference in orientation, as stakeholders did not incorporate most recommendations into their decisions. The research findings also indicate that the policy formulation process involved various considerations beyond the information conveyed through intelligence products. Overall, these results demonstrate that the link between intelligence analysis and government decisions has been established, but the level of integration in the policy formulation process remains limited.

Discussion

Political Preference as a Source of Institutional Disconnect

Results of process tracing and pattern matching indicate that intelligence products had been produced, disseminated, and discussed before the government enacted the 2022 policy to increase fuel prices. However, most of the recommendations submitted by BIN were not integrated into government decisions. This finding suggests that limited intelligence integration was not caused by a failure to provide information, but rather by differing orientations in the policy formulation process. Intelligence analysis emphasised structural improvements in energy sector governance, multidimensional risk mitigation, and anticipating social impacts, while government policy focused more on fiscal stabilisation in response to the 2022 global oil price surge.

This finding supports research by Campbell (2013), Treverton (2009), and Sternberg (2019), which suggests that limited intelligence integration is more often influenced by the dynamics of the decision-making process than the quality of intelligence products. However, previous research generally examined the intelligence-policy gap in the context of war, terrorism, and foreign policy. This research indicates that the same pattern also occurs in strategic economic policies, particularly the policy for increasing fuel prices, thus broadening the application of the intelligence-policy relationship and intelligence-policy gap concepts to the economic security sector.

These findings align with the intelligence-policy relationship concept proposed by Lowenthal (2009, 2021). Lowenthal explains that the relationship between intelligence organisations and policymakers is separated by a semi-permeable membrane, a mechanism that allows intelligence to provide information, analysis, and policy scenarios without determining political decisions. On the other hand, policymakers can figure out what strategic information they need without telling intelligence analysts what to look for. This framework explains that limited intelligence integration does not necessarily reflect poor analytical quality but can arise when policy orientation differs from the recommendations generated through the intelligence process.

This difference in orientation is evident in the 2022 policy for increasing fuel prices. BIN's analysis positions energy issues as a multidimensional threat that requires improved upstream sector governance, strengthened distribution oversight, and mitigation of potential economic, social, political, and security impacts. Conversely, the government prioritises controlling the burden of energy subsidies and fiscal stability through fuel price adjustments and the distribution of social assistance. These differing priorities explain why most intelligence recommendations were not incorporated into government-issued decisions, even though intelligence products were available prior to the decision-making process.




Figure 3. Configuration of the Pro-Government Coalition in Parliament.

Source: Author's compilation based on media reports (2025).

Political configuration also influenced the formulation of Indonesia's 2022 fuel price increase policy. Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of seats in the House of Representatives (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR*) among nine political parties: the

Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDI-P), Party of Functional Groups (*Partai Golongan Karya, Golkar*), Great Indonesia Movement Party (*Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya, Gerindra*), National Democratic Party (*Partai Nasional Demokrat, NasDem*), National Awakening Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB*), National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN), United Development Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP*), Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat, Demokrat), and Prosperous Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS*). The parliamentary majority held by parties supporting President Joko Widodo's administration provided a favourable political environment for implementing the fuel price increase, despite intelligence warnings concerning potential demonstrations, public dissatisfaction, and risks to social stability and security.

The predominance of government-aligned parties may have reduced parliamentary opposition to the policy, allowing political priorities to influence how intelligence assessments were considered during decision-making. The findings identify policymakers' political preferences as the principal factor constraining the integration of intelligence assessments into policy formulation, alongside the absence of formal institutional mechanisms for incorporating intelligence into government decisions. Accordingly, the second research question is addressed by demonstrating that the intelligence-policy gap arose primarily from political decision-making dynamics rather than the availability of intelligence information.

Selective Uptake of Intelligence in Policy Narratives

Pattern matching results indicate that the government adopted limited intelligence recommendations in its 2022 policy for increasing fuel prices. The State Intelligence Agency's (BIN) recommendations include improving the energy sector's governance, strengthening subsidised fuel distribution, and mitigating economic, social, political, and security risks. The government highlighted information supporting fiscal stability and accurate subsidy targeting, while recommendations for reforming the energy sector's governance received less attention.

Lowenthal (2021) explains that a process of selecting information deemed most relevant to policy objectives influences the relationship between intelligence and policy. Empirical evidence in this study indicates that the government continued to use intelligence information but selected portions that best aligned with policy priorities. BIN's analysis remained intact and did not undergo substantial changes. This pattern reflects selective uptake of intelligence information, not manipulation of the analysis results. These findings support research by Campbell (2013), Treverton (2009), and Sternberg (2019), which suggests that limited intelligence integration is more influenced by the dynamics of the policy process than the quality of intelligence analysis.

Absence of Institutional Integration Mechanism

Document analysis, interviews, and process tracing identified one factor not adequately explained in Lowenthal's framework: the lack of a procedural mechanism linking intelligence analysis to the policy formulation process. All intelligence products were available before the decision to increase fuel prices was made, submitted to the president, and discussed in a coordination forum across ministries and agencies. This evidence suggests that policymakers had access to intelligence information. The primary

issue is the lack of a mechanism that mandates systematic consideration of these recommendations at every stage of decision-making.

Analysis of Law No. 17 of 2011 on State Intelligence and Regulation of the Head of BIN No. 1 of 2022 on the organisation and work procedures of the State Intelligence Agency reinforces this finding. Neither regulation explicitly classifies intelligence products into categories such as current intelligence, strategic intelligence, and estimative intelligence, nor does it require intelligence analysis to form part of the policy formulation process. Existing provisions refer broadly to intelligence products, periodic reports, special reports, and strategic memoranda without defining their characteristics, objectives, delivery timelines, or methodological standards. Consequently, evaluating analytical quality remains difficult because each category requires different assessment criteria.

BIN Head Regulation Number 1 of 2022 does separate the functions of information collection, intelligence operations, and strategic analysis to maintain objectivity. However, this regulation does not stipulate the obligation of policymakers to provide feedback or explain the level of adoption of received recommendations. The level of utilisation of intelligence analysis ultimately depends on the judgement of each institution without the support of an evaluable feedback mechanism.

This finding expands the concept of the intelligence-policy gap proposed by Lowenthal (2021). This framework starts from the assumption that intelligence already has an institutional entry point into the policy process, thus focusing primarily on the utilisation of information by policymakers. This research reveals a different pattern. The gap appears before the information utilisation stage because there is no institutional mechanism linking intelligence analysis to the policy formulation process. This finding suggests that the effectiveness of intelligence integration depends on the quality of the analysis, as well as the institutional design that governs the relationship between intelligence organisations and policymakers.

Brantly reinforces this argument by emphasising that intelligence integration requires clear rules, procedures, and institutional access points rather than simply relying on the good will of political actors (Brantly et al., 2016). Systems lacking mandatory intelligence engagement face two major risks: selective uptake of information and neglect of analysis, which carries high political costs (Betts, 2007; Jervis, 2010). Both risks were evident in the 2022 fuel price increase, where recommendations orientated towards structural reform of the energy sector received lower adoption rates than policies focused on fiscal stability.

The implications of these findings extend to the dimensions of national resilience from the perspective of *Asta Gatra*. The low level of integration in intelligence analysis increases the vulnerability of risk management across various dimensions of national resilience. This impact is evident in the economic sector, through inflationary pressures and declining purchasing power; in the social sector, through increased public resistance; in the political sector, through potential instability due to policy rejection; and in the defence and security sectors, through increased disruptions to national stability. These characteristics emphasise that energy policy is a strategic policy that requires integrated intelligence analysis during the early stages of policy formulation so that every decision can manage cross-sector risks more effectively and strengthen national resilience.

This research shows that the limitations of intelligence integration in the 2022 fuel price increase were influenced by three interrelated factors: differences in policy orientation, selective use of intelligence information, and the lack of procedural mechanisms linking intelligence analysis to the policy formulation process. The final finding expands Lowenthal's explanation by showing that the intelligence-policy gap is influenced not only by the relationship between intelligence organisations and policymakers but also by institutional readiness to integrate intelligence into the public policy cycle. Strengthening these mechanisms has the potential to improve the quality of strategic policy formulations and strengthen national resilience through risk management across the economic, social, political, and defence and security sectors.

CONCLUSION

This study indicates that the relationship between intelligence analysis and the policy formulation process for the 2022 fuel price increase has been established through the provision and dissemination of intelligence products prior to the government's decision. However, the results of this analysis were poorly integrated into policy because the government did not adopt most recommendations. This study also identifies three factors influencing the level of integration: differences in policy orientation, selective use of intelligence information, and the lack of procedural mechanisms linking intelligence analysis to the policy formulation process. These results build on Lowenthal's idea of the intelligence-policy gap by showing that integration's limits are affected by both the preferences of policymakers and the institutional readiness that links intelligence organisations with the public policy cycle. These implications suggest that strengthening intelligence integration contributes to risk management in the economic, social, political, and defence and security sectors as part of efforts to strengthen national resilience.

The government should establish institutional mechanisms that integrate intelligence analysis into strategic policymaking through formal procedures, structured feedback on intelligence recommendations, and stronger institutional access points between intelligence organisations and policymakers. This study is limited to a single case of the 2022 fuel price increase policy and relies on legally accessible intelligence documents, limiting the transferability of its findings to other strategic policy contexts. Future studies should examine intelligence-policy gap across other strategic sectors, including food, health, and cybersecurity, and develop an intelligence-policy integration model suited to Indonesia's governance system to strengthen strategic policymaking and national resilience.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to express their gratitude to all the informants from the relevant institutions who contributed to this study, including Deputy IV and Deputy IX of the State Intelligence Agency (BIN), the Downstream Oil and Gas Regulatory Agency (BPH Migas), the Directorate General of Budget (DJA) of the Ministry of Finance, the Special Task Force for Upstream Oil and Gas Business Activities (SKK Migas) and the Directorate of Fuel within the Directorate General of Oil and Gas of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM).

Authors Contribution: Parlindungan Rumahorbo conceptualised the study, developed the methodology, analysed the data, and prepared the original draft. Muhammad Luthfi, Henny Saptatia, dan Ibrahim Kholilul Rohman supervised the research, validated the findings, reviewed the manuscript, and approved the final version.

Funding: This research received no external funding.

Conflict of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Ethics Approval and Informed Consent: This study did not require formal ethics review. Informed consent was obtained verbally from all participants prior to the interviews and recorded as part of the interview process.

Data Availability Statement: The data supporting the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author on request and are subject to confidentiality and access restrictions. BIN-related data will only be made available in a form selected and prepared by the authors and will not include classified or restricted intelligence materials.

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